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 Chapter 3 
The Scottish Parliament 
and Scottish Government 
Does Minority 
Government Make a 
Difference?  
This chapter explores the difference that minority government makes 
when compared to coalition government, focusing primarily on the 
relationship between the Scottish Parliament and Government. Chapter 
1 demonstrates that the Parliament does not have the resources to do 
much more than perform a traditional parliamentary role, monitoring 
government departments and scrutinising legislation proposed by the 
Scottish Government. Chapter 2 identifies the continued importance of 
political parties and the government-versus-opposition culture 
inherited from Westminster. This chapter builds on these insights to 
show that the image of a ‘consensus democracy’ (Lijphart, 1999) is often 
misleading in Scotland. The first eight years of devolution were marked 
by a form of majoritarian (coalition) government that would not seem 
out of place in the UK. Labour and the Liberal Democrats formed a 
governing majority able, through a strong party whip, to command a 
majority in plenary and all committees. They used that power to 
pursue a demanding legislative programme, demonstrating that the 
government produces the vast majority of legislation and that the 
Parliament struggles to do more than scrutinise policy in these 
circumstances. The only significant ‘brake’ to that process was the 
negotiation required between the coalition parties within government. 
However, even then, the production of successive ‘partnership 
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agreements’ in 1999 and 2003 gave a good idea of the legislative 
programmes in each four-year term.  
The advent of minority government was accompanied by renewed 
calls for the spirit of ‘new politics’. The image that springs to mind 
regards cooperation and negotiation between parties: the minority 
government needs the support of other parties to pass legislation and 
to stay in government for a full term; opposition parties trade that 
support for policy influence. This practice did not progress in the way 
that it does in countries, like Denmark, with a long term history of 
cooperation. The minority government lasted a full four-year term, but 
largely because no party wanted to be responsible for an extra election. 
There was some evidence of cooperation on a small number of bills 
and, more systematically, between the SNP and Conservative parties. 
However, the Scottish Parliament plenary was used largely as an 
adversarial forum and committees were not particularly effective. 
Instead, the main parties generally disengaged from Parliament. 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats rarely engaged constructively with 
the SNP government and did not seem to value the role of committee 
work in opposition. While the SNP was not able to pursue legislation in 
a small number of areas (independence, council tax reform, aspects of 
alcohol policy), it was still able to pass and amend the majority of bills 
and pursue many of its objectives without passing new primary 
legislation.  
Consequently, the imbalance of power between executive and 
legislature did not disappear in 2007 when the SNP formed a minority 
government. Rather, it demonstrated that governments could further 
most public policy without recourse to the Scottish Parliament and that 
the gulf in resources (including the number of people available to 
analyse policy issues and decisions) between the Government and 
Parliament helped undermine effective scrutiny. Further, there were no 
internal ‘brakes’ to policy because the SNP formed a rather cohesive 
single party government. This is the context for majority government in 
2011. The SNP now enjoys the parliamentary majority enjoyed by the 
Scottish Executive coalition, and the coherence the SNP enjoyed as a 
single party minority government. However, while it can now pass 
legislation in a less encumbered way, we should not expect a radical 
difference in the executive-legislative relationship, because an 
imbalance of power already existed.  
Coalition Government from 1999–2007 
The use of mixed member proportional representation for Scottish 
Parliament elections suggests that parties will rarely gain majority 
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control. Yet, devolution in 1999 produced the closest thing to majority 
government: two four-year parliamentary sessions of coalition 
government formed by the largest party, Scottish Labour, and its junior 
partner, the Scottish Liberal Democrats. In 1999, Labour won 56 seats 
and the Liberal Democrats 17, producing a majority—73 (57%) of 129 
seats (minus one seat held by Liberal Democrat Presiding Officer David 
Steel). This was followed in 2003 by a reduced but still significant 
majority—67 (52%) seats produced by Labour’s 50 and the Liberal 
Democrats’ 17 (the Presiding Officer was the SNP’s George Reid). The 
Scottish Executive coalition also commanded a majority in every 
Scottish Parliament committee. This control of the parliamentary 
arithmetic, combined with a strong party whip (particularly within 
Labour), produced a form of majoritarian government that would not 
seem out of place in the UK. 
The first eight years of devolution proved that new powers and 
institutions were not effective on their own. Rather, the implementation 
of new politics also required a cultural change among MSPs and 
political parties (Cairney, 2006). We know this now because no 
profound cultural change took place. Rather, we witnessed a curious 
mix of ‘consensus democracy’ institutions operated by politicians in the 
Westminster tradition. Although the parties were not particularly 
divided on ideological lines (Bennie and Clark, 2003), they reproduced 
a form of government-versus-opposition politics that Westminster 
parties would be proud of. In particular, the Labour-SNP relationship 
in the Scottish Parliament reflected a ‘reactionary mentality’ in which 
‘some Labour MPs were so paranoid about the Nationalists that any 
idea emanating from the SNP was immediately rejected because of its 
source’ (Dennis Canavan MSP in Arter, 2004: 83). Similarly, the 
opposition parties were quick to exploit government weaknesses on 
issues such as ‘Lobbygate’ (see chapter 8), the cost of the Scottish 
Parliament building, and Scottish Executive coalition tensions 
regarding flagship policies such as free personal care and the abolition 
of student fees (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 40; 122; 205; 242). 
The Scottish Parliament was driven primarily by parties rather than 
‘independent-minded MSPs’ (Mitchell, 2008: 77). Most importantly, the 
coalition formed between Labour and the Liberal Democrats only 
provided ‘superficial evidence of “new politics”’ and undermined the 
more meaningful political style envisaged by its architects: ‘a minority 
single-party Labour cabinet obliged to work in the Scandinavian 
manner with the opposition parties to get legislation through, would 
have vested parliament with significant policy influence and 
constituted ‘new politics’ in a real sense’ (Arter, 2004: 83). Instead, the 
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parties formed a governing majority. This gave Labour the sense of 
control that they feared would be lost if they were forced to cooperate 
on a regular basis with the SNP: ‘We have to have a settled programme 
rather than a programme where we could be ambushed every time’ 
(Maureen Macmillan, Labour MSP, in Arter, 2004: 83). Further, the 
parties produced partnership agreements that tied both to a detailed 
programme of legislation and towards supporting the Scottish 
Executive line (and collective cabinet responsibility) throughout. 
The effect of the strong party role was impressive. The coalition 
controlled the voting process in both committees and plenary, with 
Labour demonstrating a particularly strong whip in both parliamentary 
sessions—caused in part because their MSPs were screened rigorously 
before their selection (chapter 2; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 85; 
Mitchell, 2008: 77) and because Labour ministers held regular meetings 
with Labour MSPs before any committee meeting in which a significant 
vote or decision was likely to take place (although this can occasionally 
be used to exert committee power—see Cairney, 2007a: 79). There were 
similarly few instances of Liberal Democrat dissent, and none which 
threatened the coalition’s Partnership Agreement. The parties were also 
able to dictate which of their members became conveners of committees 
(although the numbers of conveners are allocated proportionately) and 
even which MSPs sat on particular committees. As a result, the 
independent role of committees was undermined as MSPs were 
appointed and then whipped, while committee turnover was too high 
to allow a meaningful level of MSP subject expertise (McGarvey and 
Cairney, 2008: 99; Scottish Council Foundation, 2002; Arter, 2003: 31–2).  
The experience from 1999–2007 suggests that it would be wrong to 
equate the formal capacity of legislatures with their power or influence 
over policy outcomes (Arter, 2006; Cairney, 2006; McGarvey and 
Cairney, 2008). From 1999–2007, the Scottish Executive coalition 
dominated the legislative process, passing so many bills that they 
undermined the ability of Parliament to set the policy agenda through 
inquiries. It presided over a punishing legislative schedule, producing 
the sense in which committees became part of a ‘legislative sausage 
machine’ rather than powerful bodies able to set the agenda through 
the inquiry process (Arter, 2002: 105). While there is some evidence of 
parliamentary influence during the scrutiny of government legislation 
(Shephard and Cairney, 2005; Cairney, 2006), the Scottish Executive 
produced and amended the majority of bills (McGarvey and Cairney, 
2008: 106), reinforcing the rule of thumb by Olson (in Arter, 2006: 250) 
that executives initiate 90% of legislation and get 90% of what they 
want. There was also a trend from 2003 towards increased Scottish 
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Executive dominance, perhaps following the honeymoon period of the 
first session (and despite the new makeup of the Parliament in which 
more small parties were represented).  
This unequal executive-legislature relationship is reflected in the 
early reports (see also Jervis and Plowden, 2001: 9–10). On the one 
hand, the first report (November 1999: 5) suggests that ‘there has been a 
heavy commitment to ensuring that everyone understands the 
importance of these committees’, and Leicester (2000: 21) points to the 
need (not felt in the old Scottish Office) for ministers to engage 
seriously with the chamber as ‘a vital arena in which to build or 
damage a political reputation’. On the other, Leicester (2000; 21; see 
also May 2000: 3; Shephard, February 2001: 17) identifies, almost 
immediately, ‘a growing concern that there are insufficient staff and 
resources’ in committees, particularly since MSPs sat on more than one 
committee and the skills of committee staff varied. Further, since few 
committees found an ability to set their own agenda (or initiate 
legislation), MSPs turned to cross-party groups less likely to be 
whipped (although see Shephard, August 2004: 8). This produced an 
additional workload on top of the punishing constituency/regional 
role and a strong impression of overload (Leicester, 2000: 22) which, 
coupled with high committee turnover and a new role for substitutes, 
undermined the ability of MSPs to become experts in their subject areas 
(Shephard, February 2001: 19; Cairney, January 2006: 25). The problem 
prompted the Parliamentary Bureau (which determines parliamentary 
business; it was controlled by Labour and the Liberal Democrats) to 
discuss an early restructuring of committees to ensure that they could 
deal with the imbalances of Scottish Executive policy priorities (the 
Justice Committee was under particular strain). Yet, problems of 
overload were still pronounced at the end of parliamentary sessions 
when some committees were obliged to process a large number of bills 
before the election recess (Cairney, September 2007: 14). 
Problems of overload were often reinforced by the lack of 
information necessary to provide effective scrutiny. In the case of 
finance, the Financial Issues Advisory Group (FIAG, the sister of the 
Consultative Steering Group) was strong on the need for the Scottish 
Parliament to have reliable financial information to help the Parliament 
hold the Executive to account and therefore allow ‘the people of 
Scotland [to] have a say in how money is spent’ (February 2000: 15). 
Further, the first budget bill was preceded by a ‘seemingly open 
consultation process’ explaining how budgets have been allocated in 
the past and, according to Donald Dewar, giving ‘“people from across 
the whole spectrum of Scottish society a say in how the resources at the 
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Executive’s disposal should be spent”’ (May 2000: 11). Yet, the reports 
are sceptical about the effect this has on budgets, particularly since 
spending demands have to be met by reducing spending elsewhere. 
The May (2000: 12) report highlights the importance of incrementalism, 
particularly when existing recipients of resources resist change, and 
argues that even one of the most pressing issues (tuition fees) combined 
with a ‘carefully considered and costed report’ (the Cubie Report) 
resulted in finding the money from within the same department, 
suggesting that it would be difficult for the Finance Committee to 
influence anything but modest changes within existing and discrete 
budgets. The Finance Committee may have the potential to be the most 
powerful, but ‘it has yet to make that influence felt’ (May, 2000: 12).  
Similarly, while the committee established its right to produce an 
‘alternative set of proposals’ (effectively an ‘alternative budget’—
November 2000: 36), there is no evidence to suggest that it ever 
demonstrated that ability (indeed, Bell August 2003: 32 argues that a 
significant alternative supported by Parliament would oblige the 
Executive to resign). Instead, much of its time was devoted to trying, 
generally unsuccessfully, to get reliable figures from the Scottish 
Executive (Bell, August 2001: 36; Cairney, January 2006: 23). In some 
cases this issue is caused by the problems tracking money when it is 
spent locally in a discretionary way (Bell, August 2001: 35–6). In others, 
the problem is caused by incomplete information, or information which 
lacks comparisons with previous years (Bell, August 2001: 36). Further, 
the time for detailed scrutiny is curtailed once every four years by the 
‘electoral period of “purdah”’ (Bell, August 2003: 32; Winetrobe, June 
2003: 3; there is also a purdah of sorts during UK general elections, 
restricting the Scottish Executive to publicising ‘worthy but dull’ public 
policy announcements and parliamentary debates the month before—
Winetrobe, August 2001: 8–10). 
In the case of the European Committee, MSPs were effectively kept 
in the dark because Scottish Executive discussions with the UK 
government (regarding the UK line in the EU) were kept confidential. 
Thus, its attempts to emulate Westminster and adopt a ‘scrutiny 
reserve’, in which a final position could not be made without 
parliamentary approval, were never successful (Wright, February 2002: 
32). Instead, it began ‘scrutinising the implementation of EU policies’, 
conducting ‘inquiries into issues that are of strategic interest’ and 
making sure that Scottish ministers gave evidence at the start of each 
EU presidency (Wright, May 2002: 45–6; see Wright, August 2002: 30; 
Wright, November 2002: 25; Wright, November 2003: 36–7; Wright, 
May 2004: 44; Wright, August 2004: 34–5 and Wright, November 2004: 
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22 on its continued lack of influence despite its membership of the 
Network of Regional Parliamentary European Committees). For 
example, in 2007 it produced a strategic report, calling for earlier 
Scottish Executive engagement in the ‘upstream’ phase of policy 
development to address the problems with its obligations when EU 
policy comes ‘downstream’ (Cairney, April 2007: 8). In one case, both 
committees suffered the same problem, when the Finance and 
European committees could not convince the Scottish Secretary to 
attend their meetings to explain how EU structural funds would work. 
While this became a matter for the Presiding Officer (November 2000: 
36–7), the issue was never resolved. 
The reports quickly suggest that any initial hopes for non-executive 
legislation soon faded and ‘Parliament has had very little time to 
consider anything else but Executive bills’ (Shephard August 2001: 13). 
Shephard (November 2001: 17–18; August, 2002: 8–9; June 2003: 6) 
notes that Executive Bills receive priority over Members’ Bills, 
reflecting (from 1999–2007) the dominance of the coalition-controlled 
Parliamentary Bureau and a concern expressed by the Procedures 
Committee that the Parliament is becoming ‘a “conveyor belt for 
passing legislation” ... at the expense of quality scrutiny and influence’ 
(Shephard, June 2003: 9). This view was reinforced by various ‘legacy’ 
reports of committees bemoaning the lack of time for inquiries because 
of the amount of legislation (Cairney, April 2007: 12–14; note the 
Conservative claim that Scottish Executive ministers admitted to 
suffering from ‘legislationitis’—Cairney, January 2007: 22).  
Members’ Bills were used increasingly to set the agenda only 
(Shephard, November 2003: 7; Shephard, February 2004; Cairney, May 
2006: 25; April 2007: 14). Further, this ability was constrained, following 
changes to the standing orders that undermined the ability of 
opposition and small parties to have bill proposals accepted (Shephard, 
August 2004: 7). Indeed, the strain on the Scottish Parliament’s Non-
Executive Bills Unit (NEBU) was used by the Procedures Committee 
and four main parties to justify reforming the rules on member’s bills to 
make it harder to introduce them (Shephard, 2004: 7), producing some 
suspicion that this was designed to stop the smaller parties such as the 
SSP setting the agenda (Cairney, January 2006: 30; September 2006: 25; 
April 2007: 15; but note that there is still an issue of capacity—Maddox, 
2009) 
The coalition’s control of the parliamentary arithmetic also 
undermined the independence of committees. It was used to pass a 
motion limiting the ability of committees to exercise their evidence-
gathering powers, producing a Westminster-style relationship 
46 The Scottish Political System Since Devolution 
associated with the term ‘MacOsmotherly Rules’ to ensure that civil 
service advice to ministers remains confidential (‘Osmotherly Rules’ 
refers to guidance to UK civil servants on how to give evidence to select 
committees—see Mitchell, 2001: 59; MacMillan, November, 2000: 13; 
Shephard, February 2001: 18; Winetrobe, February 2002: 9; see also 
Cairney, April 2007: 17 on non-disclosure during the McKie inquiry). 
There is little evidence of effective parliamentary scrutiny of the 
Scottish Executive’s governance functions and ‘it has no formal say 
either on the division of governmental business into particular 
portfolios, or the allocation of ministers to those portfolios’ (Winetrobe, 
May 2001: 9–11). The introduction by First Minister Jack McConnell of 
Ministerial Party Aides (MSPs who support particular ministers and sit 
on committees) could also be interpreted as a further move to maintain 
a consistent party line in Parliament (Winetrobe, May 2002: 7; Mitchell 
et al, 2003: 130; see also Winetrobe, November 2002; 6; the Scottish 
Executive also failed to inform Parliament of two appointments in 2003, 
‘undermining its own open government policies’ and obscuring ‘their 
participation in plenary and committee proceedings’—Winetrobe, May 
2004: 3). This, combined with the lack of career advancement 
opportunities outside of the Scottish Executive, unlike in Westminster 
where backbenchers can pursue senior committee roles, makes it 
difficult to find evidence of a strong independent parliament. 
Mitchell (2004: 35–36) argues that the ‘myth of a strong legislature’ 
was entertained by the Scottish Executive when it suited its interests, 
such as when it wanted to shuffle off responsibility for the cost of the 
Scottish Parliament building. Overall, the ‘committees have worked 
well but there is a tendency towards self-satisfied myth-making and an 
exaggeration of success which has crowded out appreciation of failings’ 
(Mitchell, 2005: 27). Much of this ‘success’ often merely relates to its 
ability to get better information from the Scottish Executive (see for 
example Cairney, January 2006: 23; January 2007: 26). There may also 
be a tendency to conflate the value of the Scottish Parliament with the 
opportunities afforded by devolution—such as when Shephard (August, 
2001: 13–14) lauds the ability of the Parliament to process legislation 
that Westminster would not have had the time or the inclination for 
(before stating in November, 2001: 19 that there is minimal power-
sharing between Executive and Parliament). In effect, we are left with a 
party-dominated Parliament that enjoys sporadic wins in the context of 
a fairly powerless position (for examples of its wins see: the election of 
the Deputy Presiding Officer—Mitchell, February 2002; 4; amendments 
regarding smacking children, Shephard, November 2002: 7; Winetrobe, 
November 2002: 34; fire service reform, Shephard, February 2003: 9; 
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and, the rejection of part 3 of the Protection of Vulnerable Groups 
(Scotland) Bill due to insufficient consultation, Cairney, January 2007: 
27–8; Shephard, April 2005: 6). 
Overall, the Scottish Parliament and its committees enjoyed neither 
the resources with which to scrutinise government policy effectively 
nor the stability nor independence necessary to assert their new 
powers. Further, although members and committees have the ability to 
initiate legislation, the same rules apply: members are constrained by 
party affiliation and limited resources, while committees rarely find the 
time or inclination to legislate (Bort, January 2006: 42–3). After a 
honeymoon period in the first parliamentary session, the Scottish 
Parliament produced non-executive legislation comparable in number 
and scope with Westminster (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 103). From 
1999–2003, 50 Scottish Executive, 1 committee and 8 member’s bills 
were passed while from 2003–7 the split was 53, 1, and 3. From 1999–
2003 166 inquiries were conducted (Arter, 2004: 77), but this fell to 99 in 
2003–07 (of which 11 were short or one-day inquiries). In short, ‘while 
the Scottish Parliament’s powers are extensive in comparison to most 
West European legislatures, it is much more difficult to demonstrate 
the effects of their powers in relation to the Government in the first two 
parliamentary sessions’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 108). The 
evidence of new politics and the effects of the new institutions were 
thin on the ground.  
Minority Government from 2007–11 
In this context, it is understandable that May 2007 was seen by many as 
a new beginning. Newly-elected Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson used 
his acceptance speech to call for the return of new politics (Scottish 
Parliament Official Report 14.5.07 col. 13). However, the first thing to 
note is that minority government was not the SNP’s first choice. 
Instead, it followed the combination of unusual parliamentary 
arithmetic and an inability of the SNP and Liberal Democrats to agree 
on the terms of a coalition.  
In 2007 the potential for coalition was not straightforward. The SNP 
won 47 seats compared to Labour’s 46 but, given the nature of the 
overall result (the Conservatives won 17, Liberal Democrats 16, Green 2 
and Margo MacDonald 1) it could not form a majority coalition with 
one other party. Although there was some scope for cooperation 
between the SNP and the Greens (based on the same attitude to 
Scottish independence and an SNP commitment to certain 
environmental issues), its potential links to the other parties were 
problematic. Formal coalition between the SNP and Liberal Democrats 
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proved impossible when the latter insisted that the former drop its 
plans for an independence referendum (Lynch, September 2007: 66; 72). 
Further, a formal coalition with the Conservatives would be politically 
damaging for the SNP in the short term (the Conservatives are still 
tainted by 18 years of unpopular government in Scotland from 1979–97; 
the SNP is to some extent a left-wing social democratic party) and the 
long term (the SNP may campaign for independence by highlighting 
the re-emergence of a ‘democratic deficit’ in Scotland and minimal 
support for a Conservative government ruling Scotland).  
Therefore, the SNP was initially reluctant, but effectively obliged, to 
form a single party minority. The rhetoric on the scope for ‘new 
politics’ under minority government was only spoken loudly after the 
options for coalition had been exhausted. The SNP subsequently made 
a ‘virtue out of necessity’ (Mitchell, 2008: 79) but was uncertain about 
its ability to make legislative progress (or at least present an image of 
governing competence—Paun, 2009) and was not confident about its 
ability, or the ability of any minority government, to stay in office for 
the four-year period. This reflects two main factors. First, despite 
Strøm’s (1990) best efforts,4 it reflects a strong ‘conventional view’ of 
minority government that ‘associates it with instability, inefficiency, 
incoherence and a lack of accountability’ (Mitchell, 2008: 73). There is a 
strong, longstanding culture or set of assumptions held by most parties 
in Scotland in favour of majority government (although there is some 
evidence that Labour studied minority government in 2006 and 
perhaps favoured it from 2007—Lynch, January 2007: 69). Minority 
equates with instability not opportunity; potential opposition and 
disarray, not opportunities for new politics. There is also the occasional 
charge, regarding the SNP’s independence agenda, that minority 
government is unrepresentative (McIver and Gay, 2008). Second, the 
‘conventional view’ has been reinforced in the UK by the very limited, 
unhappy experience of minority Westminster government in the mid 
and late 1970s (Mitchell, 2008: 74; Cairney, 2009).  
In other words, the omens did not look good: minority government 
appeared to be a necessity rather than a choice. Scottish politics lacked 
a factor key to minority government success: a feeling that it is a 
desirable way to engage in politics. In this light, we witnessed a 
remarkable turnaround of the image of minority government in 
Scotland (for an ‘insider view’, see Harvie, 2008). It is striking how 
quickly minority government became the norm in Scotland in the sense 
                                                           
4 Strøm (1990: 237) argues that minority governments are common, not aberrations, and 
that they may result from rational strategic calculations rather than ‘as a consequence of 
political instability, conflict and malaise’. 
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that, while the SNP Government was challenged regularly on its 
policies and governing record, its right to govern was not. Most 
importantly, the SNP Government served for a full four year term 
despite minimal evidence of the behaviour and attitudes we might 
associate with new politics. In fact, if anything, partisan tensions 
increased from 2007.  
For example, one of the longest running sores in the 2007–11 session 
regarded the use by opposition MSPs of points of order to question the 
veracity of ministerial statements. While we may accept and even enjoy 
a degree of partisanship during the theatre of First Minister’s 
Questions, this was taken to the extreme by allegations that ministers 
were making untruthful and misleading statements to Parliament 
(Cairney, 2009b). This prompted two key responses (as well as a 
revision to the Scottish Ministerial Code). First, Alex Salmond took the 
unprecedented step of referring complaints about his conduct to the 
new independent advisory panel consisting of the two former 
Presiding Officers David Steel and George Reid (which ruled in all 
three cases that he did not mislead Parliament—Cairney, May 2009: 32–
3; Cairney, September 2009: 41; Scottish Government, 2010). Second, 
Alex Fergusson reiterated a belief, held variously by all Presiding 
Officers (and reflected in Standing Orders), that he should not become 
the arbiter of the truthfulness of comments made by any MSP in 
Parliament. Instead, he asked the Standards committee to investigate 
the use of points of order. In turn, the committee endorsed Fergusson’s 
view, proposed new guidance on the party political use of points of 
order, and called for a joint protocol between the Scottish Government 
and Parliament on their respective roles (Cairney, May 2009: 32).  
The perceived need to introduce new mechanisms in this way 
presents a counterintuitive conclusion: that partisanship increased and 
cooperation decreased during minority government. Yet, it did not 
seriously undermine the SNP’s position, largely because: the 
opposition parties did not want to be held responsible for holding an 
extra election (a successful vote of no confidence would oblige the 
government to resign and prompt an election if a new First Minister 
could not be found in 28 days); few parties could afford to finance an 
extra election; and, the opposition parties could not hope to improve 
their number of seats, since Alex Salmond and the SNP were generally 
popular throughout.  
The maintenance of these arrangements reinforced the imbalance of 
power between Government and Parliament, in four main ways. First, 
the SNP Government was able to distance itself from the Scottish 
Parliament by pursuing many of its policy aims without recourse to 
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legislation (Cairney, September 2007b: 83; September 2008: 94). The 
Scottish Government has the vast majority of policy capacity and many 
of its policy aims (on intergovernmental relations, the civil service, 
capital finance projects, public service targets, curriculum reform, 
prescription charges) were pursued without using legislation, while 
others could be pursued using legislation that exists (i.e. with 
secondary legislation and regulations much less subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny) (Cairney, September 2007: 82). Further, small 
committee size and MSP turnover still undermine the abilities of 
committees to scrutinize government policy and the huge gulf in 
resources remains (Cairney, January 2008: 17). The best example 
regards the Scottish Government’s concordat with COSLA to grant 
local authorities more discretion in the use of their budgets, and more 
leeway when monitoring local outcomes (chapter 6)—a decision that 
undermined the ability of the Scottish Parliament to monitor local 
authorities through the Scottish Government. 
Second, the Scottish Parliament produced minimal legislation and 
proved unable to go beyond the level of scrutiny and agenda setting 
that it achieved from 1999–2007. Most notably, from 2007–9, the 
Scottish Parliament did not use the opportunity to assert its position at 
a time of low legislative output. A key outcome of the 1999–2007 
sessions was a widespread sense that too much legislation had been 
produced and that a new government should slow down (Cairney, 
September 2007: 24; 83; Mitchell, in correspondence). The ‘legacy’ 
reports produced by committees in 2007 suggested that they were 
unable to perform their scrutiny and inquiry functions properly 
because there was too much legislation to consider (McGarvey and 
Cairney, 2008: 102). Minority government had an initial effect. The SNP 
Government, already committed in its manifesto to a reduction in 
legislative volume (and faced with a tight budget that precluded 
expensive policy innovation), found that it did not have the votes to 
pass legislative measures that it would certainly have introduced if it 
enjoyed a majority (including a referendum bill in 2010). Consequently, 
from 2007–9, legislative demands on the Scottish Parliament were not 
high. The SNP’s first legislative programme was dubbed by opposition 
parties as ‘legislation lite’ (Cairney, September 2007: 83), while Labour’s 
business manager, Michael McMahon, labelled Alex Salmond as a 
‘work-shy First Minister leading a group of idle ministers’ because the 
Scottish Government had passed seven pieces of legislation in two 
years (Peterkin, 2009; note that opposition party criticism of the 
legislative programme has always been an annual event).  
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Yet, the Parliament did not fill the legislative gap. There has not 
been a perceptible rise in successful legislation initiated by committees 
or MSPs since 2007 (committees passed 2 bills and members passed 7 
from 2007–11, compared to 3 and 8 from 1999–2003 and 1 and 3 from 
2003–7). While there was some talk by Labour regarding their 
alternative legislative programme (Cairney, September 2008: 97; May 
2009: 31), this never took off (and it seemed to consist of four member’s 
bills—Holyrood.com, 2008). While committees had more time to set the 
policy agenda through inquiries, few used their time effectively 
(compare with the second session committees which had begun to 
identify useful cross-party issues—Cairney, September 2006: 20–1; 
January 2006: 27–30; April, 2007: 15). Few found enough common 
ground to pursue a long-term inquiry in any meaningful way, while 
others merely exploited the chance to make party political points with 
short, headline grabbing, inquiries (Cairney, January 2008: 16 discusses 
the inquiry into Donald Trump’s development in the Menie estate; see 
also Cairney, May 2008: 17–18; September 2008: 20–1; for more recent 
evidence that committees were able to find areas of common interest, 
see Cairney, September 2008: 21; January 2009: 37–8; September 2009: 
45–8).  
Third, the Scottish Government produced most policy and passed 
and amended most legislation. Overall, it produced 42 bills in four 
years (compared to 50 and 53 in previous sessions). Its small number of 
high-profile manifesto successes includes a bill to abolish the graduate 
endowment and, less importantly, to abolish bridge tolls. Its ability to 
pass so many other bills reflects the fact that a large proportion of 
government business in Parliament is rather innocuous legislation that 
would have been passed by any party. There is little incentive for the 
opposition parties to oppose the principles of, for example, a bill 
reforming flooding policy. The SNP also inherited many bills from its 
predecessor government (on issues such as the need to prepare for the 
Commonwealth Games, reform the judiciary and courts, reform public 
health law, and revise the law on sexual offences).  
The tangible effect of the opposition parties on Scottish Government 
legislation is unclear. While we could reasonably expect more 
government defeats and amendments coming from opposition parties, 
the effect on the substance of legislation does not seem particularly 
significant. For example, 98.7% of Scottish Government amendments to 
its own legislation were passed successfully from 2007–11 (figures from 
Steven MacGregor; see MacGregor, 2010) compared to 99.4% from 
1999–2003 (Cairney, 2006: 186). The SNP Government lost more votes 
than its predecessors, but its legislative programme remained 
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unharmed and very few bills were amended against the SNP’s wishes. 
To a large extent, the SNP was helped by support from the 
Conservative party, with the two parties voting together 72% of the 
time, reflecting almost 100% Conservative support for the majority of 
SNP bills (MacGregor, 2010). In some cases, in the absence of 
Conservative support, the SNP was able to use support from other 
parties (e.g. on tobacco control policy—an agenda furthered by the 
previous Scottish Executive). In one other, it benefited from 
parliamentary rules that effectively limited the extent to which the 
Scottish Parliament could amend a bill. The opposition parties could 
not amend the Education (Additional Support for Learning) Bill as 
much as they hoped, because the Scottish Government had not passed 
a Financial Resolution—effectively prompting the Presiding Officer to 
reject amendments which involved significant additional costs 
(references to this constraint can be found in the stage 2 debate—
Scottish Parliament Education, Lifelong Learning and Culture 
Committee Official Report 25.3.09 Col.2165—and the stage 3 debate—
Scottish Parliament Official Report, 20.5.09 Cols. 17576–644).  
Although there may be some evidence that civil servants were more 
likely to anticipate the reactions of opposition parties when developing 
policy (Paun, 2009: 52), there is less to suggest that this affected policy 
substantively. Indeed, civil servants appeared to be committed to 
implementing SNP policy and, in some cases, defending that policy 
and the Scottish Government’s record in public (Paun, 2009: 52; 
Cairney, September 2009: 53). Further, the process is nothing like 
coalition government in which civil servants had to clear policy with 
two parties (Paun, 2009: 52; Cairney, 2011a). Therefore, if anything, the 
Scottish Parliament has become an occasionally effective policy-stifling 
forum, acting as a deterrent to some policy initiation and slowing down 
the legislative sausage machine, without using the extra time to any 
great effect.  
Fourth, a lot of opposition party activity was geared towards the 
production of non-legislative motions. The Scottish Government’s 
initial reaction prompted some concern that it was subverting the role 
of Parliament by ignoring its wishes (Davidson, 2008). The first 
example followed the motion passed by the opposition parties in 
favour of continued funding for the Edinburgh Airport Rail Link and 
Edinburgh tram project. Both John Swinney and Alex Salmond were 
accused of bending the will of Parliament, with Swinney citing 
irresolvable problems in EARL and Salmond quoting Donald Dewar to 
suggest that he was not bound by parliamentary motions (Cairney, 
September 2007; 22; Mitchell, 2008: 80). However, even in this case 
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there is evidence of a negotiated position (the trams project did go 
ahead) and ministers generally seek to avoid unnecessary 
confrontations, particularly since too many confrontations produce 
opposition party pressure for ministers to resign (see the case of Kenny 
MacAskill and court reform—Cairney, May 2009: 52). Instead, SNP 
whips and business managers sought to avoid confrontations by 
negotiating the wording of motions with their counterparts in other 
parties (Cairney, May 2008: 18; January 2009: 35–6) and acting on many 
motions (Cairney, January 2008: 21).  
The best example may be the Scottish Government’s decision to 
drop plans for a flagship bill introducing a local income tax, although 
many other factors were in play (for example, the UK Government 
refused to modify the rules on council tax benefit—Cairney, 2012a; 
chapter 9). Parliamentary opposition, along with the uncertainty over 
funding, was cited by Finance Secretary John Swinney as the reason to 
withdraw the policy (Scott, May 2009: 75). Yet, few motions forced the 
hands of the Scottish Government in that way. Far more motions either 
demonstrated a lack of united opposition or merely (in examples such 
as police numbers or rural schools) sought to ‘reinforce existing 
Scottish Government policies and place them higher on its agenda’ 
(Cairney, May 2009: 38). This agenda-setting role is also a feature of the 
better committee inquiries (Cairney, September 2009: 45–8; 57). 
Overall, this outcome is not surprising because, despite the range of 
Scottish Parliament ‘powers’, it was not designed to be a policymaking 
body. Rather, the institution represents an attempt to improve on the 
scrutiny powers of Westminster without marking a profound change in 
the executive-legislative relationship. Committees have the power to 
hold ministers and civil servants to account, to make sure they consult 
properly (i.e. they do not undertake large consultations themselves) 
and to initiate legislation as a last resort if MSPs believe that 
government policy is inadequate. They are also instructed by the CSG 
to let the government govern, arguably encouraged to play a minimal 
pre-legislative role and, particularly in the case of the budget, not well 
equipped to develop alternative legislation (see Cairney, September 
2009: 47–8 for a discussion of the Finance Committee inquiry and new 
Financial Scrutiny Unit). Further, the Scottish Parliament’s lack of a 
‘scrutiny reserve’ for EU issues, combined with issues such as the 
release of the Lockerbie bomber, suggests that it often has no role to 
play before Scottish ministerial decisions are made (Cairney, September 
2009: 40–1). The resources of committees and opposition parties are too 
thin on the ground to provide anything more than scrutiny and 
criticism (and there appears to be no appetite to boost the resources of 
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committees). It would therefore take much more than minority 
government to solve the wider problem of parliamentary constraint.  
Scottish Parliament committees did not provide the ‘motor of a new 
politics’, particularly since Labour’s front bench did not sit on them and 
Labour did not fully engage with them (in part because the former 
Scottish Executive does not want to scrutinise its own policies). Rather, 
key debates were played out and negotiations were conducted in 
plenary. Indeed, there seemed to be a rise in the propensity to overturn 
decisions reached in committee in plenary from 2007–11. In the 1999–
2003 session the key indicator of respect for committee decisions was 
the non-Executive amendment of Executive legislation—less than 80% 
of these were reversed by a Scottish Executive (which had the majority 
to reverse them all), in part because committee assertiveness was linked 
to at least one vote by an MSP from a Scottish Executive party (Cairney, 
2006: 203). From 2007–11, the parliamentary arithmetic was such that a 
Scottish Government bill may have been amended against its wishes at 
stage 2 merely because the Scottish Government and its supporting 
party did not have enough votes, only for this to be reversed in plenary 
at stage 3 when they did (see, for example, The Herald, 2009 on 
children’s hearings). Or, in the case of the Graduate Endowment 
Abolition (Scotland) Bill, the whole bill may be rejected in committee 
only to be approved in plenary (Cairney, January 2008: 23). In many 
cases this is linked to the post-2007 abandonment by conveners of the 
status quo convention (in which conveners, when asked to provide a 
casting vote, would generally vote against an amendment to maintain 
existing policy). Instead, many used their casting vote strategically, 
undermining the convention that committee decisions are respected in 
plenary.  
Minority Government and the Annual Budgets 
The budget bill process took on a new significance under minority 
government. It became the most important legislative test because there 
was an obligation for a majority of the Scottish Parliament to agree to 
the bill each year. Effectively, for minority government to continue, the 
Scottish Government must seek agreement for its budget and a 
proportion of the opposition parties must find a way to reach a 
negotiated settlement. This process showed the best and worst aspects 
of minority government. First, it is certainly more significant than 
under coalition or majority government (it was a routine process from 
1999–2007). Yet, there are still similarities: only government ministers 
may amend the bill; and, committees still tend to focus on limited 
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aspects of the budget, reflecting a lack of information and resources 
with which to conduct effective scrutiny.  
Second, there have been concessions, but their overall importance is 
debatable; they did not contradict SNP policy but perhaps forced it to 
make choices among competing priorities. In the first budget, the 
Conservatives secured a greater commitment to fund new police 
officers and to revisit drugs policy (with the hope that the SNP would 
move further from harm reduction to abstention—chapter 8), 
independent Margo MacDonald secured special funding status for 
Edinburgh and the Greens secured a commitment to the ‘carbon 
assessment’ of spending plans (Cairney, May 2008: 16). In the second, 
the Conservatives secured a reduction in business rates, Labour 
secured funding for modern apprenticeships and the Liberal Democrats 
secured a vague commitment for the SNP to involve Parliament more 
in budget planning and engage with the Calman Commission on fiscal 
autonomy (the Greens lost a larger commitment to fund home 
insulation when their votes were no longer required). In the third, the 
Conservatives secured an independent review of Scottish Government 
spending in preparation for expected cuts following the economic 
crisis, the Liberal Democrats secured £20m for college places and £10m 
to the Scottish Investment Bank, and the Greens secured £12m towards 
home insulation and boiler schemes. In the fourth, the Conservatives 
secured modest spending increases on housing and business, while the 
other parties secured new targets on employment apprenticeships and 
college bursaries (BBC News, 2011). Overall, the concessions represent 
a small fraction of the overall budget (for example, Bell’s 2011 
calculation is a change of 0.04% in the 2008/9 budget). 
Third, few parties took a consistent negotiating position. The 
Conservative party was the only consistent actor, seeking concessions 
in exchange for support. The Greens surprised many by voting against 
the second bill despite securing concessions. The Liberal Democrats 
opposed the first two bills (only to support the second bill when 
revised marginally) and abstained in the third. Labour abstained in 
year one for fear of causing the bill to fall, opposed in year two—
contributing unwittingly to the bill’s failure on the assumption that the 
SNP had secured Green support5 (followed by support for the second 
bill when assured on modern apprenticeships)—and opposed in years 
three (citing the loss of the Glasgow Airport Rail link) and four (citing a 
mere 0.1% movement towards Labour concessions—see Scottish 
                                                           
5 A similar example of Labour and Liberal Democrat bafflement and miscalculation can 
be found in the failure of the Creative Scotland Bill (Cairney, September 2008: 15). 
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Parliament Official Report 9.2.11) when it was clear that it was safe to 
do so.  
Finally, the failure of the second budget bill did not deserve the 
incredible amount of Scottish and UK attention it attracted. Rather, the 
process showed that the parties could work together very effectively 
when faced with an apparent crisis, and a new bill (almost identical to 
the defeated one) was passed the following week. The budget crisis 
showed that there was little appetite among the opposition parties for 
an impromptu election, particularly when Alex Salmond remained 
popular.  
Conclusion  
The Scottish Parliament is not a policymaking body. Instead, it is a 
scrutinising, revising and legitimising chamber with limited powers to 
scrutinise and revise. This point is most apparent under majority single 
party and coalition government, but is still the case under minority 
government. While the advent of minority government was 
accompanied by renewed calls for new politics in the spirit originally 
envisaged, it actually represented the last nail in its coffin. The 
Parliament has been a peripheral part of the Scottish policy process for 
the majority of its 12 year existence and majority government will only 
accelerate its declining importance.  
In the first eight years, the Labour and Liberal Democrat coalition 
performed the role of a majority government, controlling the vote in 
plenary and committees and passing so much legislation that most 
committees devoted most of their activities to scrutiny (instead of 
agenda setting inquiries). There was little evidence of ‘power sharing’ 
and much more evidence of a concentration of power in the 
government combined with an adversarial atmosphere that we 
associated so much with ‘old Westminster’. We might have expected a 
big difference in the latter four years, with the Scottish Government 
finally having to negotiate with opposition parties in the Parliament to 
secure its policy aims. Yet, with the exception of some high profile 
government retreats (on the independence referendum, local taxation 
reform and minimum alcohol pricing—all of which are set to return), 
there was a muted parliamentary effect. The Scottish Government 
produced and amended the vast majority of the legislation and found 
that they could pursue many of their aims without recourse to 
Parliament. Committees were no more effective. Indeed, at times, they 
seemed less effective because the main opposition parties seemed 
disinterested in committee business, party politics got in the way of 
business-like cooperation, or simply because they did not have the 
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resources or authority to find out how local and health authorities were 
spending public money.  
In this light, it is time to stop kidding ourselves about ‘new politics’ 
for three main reasons. First, what we have, and have had for some 
time, is government and opposition. Second, the term breeds 
complacency. It makes it look like Scotland solved electoral and 
intuitional design before 1999 and that it is superior to its London 
counterpart. Instead, Westminster is also changing as an institution, 
while Holyrood’s institution has not changed parliamentary behaviour. 
Third, ‘new politics’ is a heavy chain around the neck of Scottish 
politics, producing unrealistic expectations and therefore skewed 
evaluations of the success of new political practices. In the absence of 
such expectations, we may come to different conclusions about the first 
eight years of coalition government which provided some examples of 
new parliamentary influence, the ability of committees to be 
‘businesslike’ and the ability of Scottish Executive ministers to 
negotiate and compromise rather than dominate Parliament. Similarly, 
we should be careful not to judge the experience of minority 
government too harshly. Although ‘new politics’ as originally 
envisaged has not materialised, the arrangements proved to be 
relatively stable, allowing the SNP Government to demonstrate an 
impressive degree of policy coherence and governing competence. The 
main caveat is that the minority years were marked by high SNP 
popularity, suggesting that it would not be in the interests of the 
opposition parties to destabilise minority government—particularly 
since they may be held responsible and would need to fund an extra, 
expensive, election campaign. It is therefore difficult to attribute the 
new system to a powerful new norm when an explanation based on 
party self-interest is just as convincing.  
Equally unclear is the effect that minority government has on public 
policy. Eight years of coalition government largely produced a policy 
agenda driven by the government. Four years of minority government 
has produced a new relationship between the Scottish Government and 
Parliament, but this is not based on the eagerness on either side to mark 
a profound shift in responsibility for policy formulation and 
implementation. The initial drop in legislative activity from the Scottish 
Government was not met with an equivalent rise from Parliament. 
Committees did not produce more agenda setting inquiries. Rather, the 
Parliament became a forum for limited policy concessions based largely 
on the (usually uncontroversial) Government legislative agenda. The 
opposition parties also have a very limited ability to monitor 
Government policy activity that is not brought to parliament for 
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regular approval. We may find evidence of parliamentary power in 
other areas—such as in the anticipated reactions of the SNP when 
deciding which bills to pursue and when civil servants, developing 
policy, pay heed to what they perceive to be the parliament’s (as well as 
the minister’s) ‘mind’. However, this is an area of public policy that has 
not been researched in great depth either in Scotland or in the 
comparative literature.  
From the evidence that we have, it is difficult to identify enough 
policy influence for opposition parties to give them an incentive to 
eschew public office when it is available. This is not really an issue for 
the Conservatives who are not likely to be offered the chance to form a 
government and will therefore benefit more from minority 
government. However, the lack of policy influence enjoyed by the 
Liberal Democrats since 2007 seems to diminish the probability that it 
will accept minority government in the future (assuming that it 
recovers some of its vote and majority SNP governments do not 
become the norm). Strøm (1990) argues that minority governments are 
most likely in political systems, such as Scotland’s, which possess 
strong parliaments. The argument is that a strong parliament gives an 
opposition party the chance to have policy influence. The party is 
therefore content to negotiate policy concessions, from a minority 
government that often needs its support, and wait until the next 
election produces a better result. Yet, the Scottish experience shows us 
that relatively high parliamentary power, when compared to other 
legislatures, does not translate into policy outcomes. In the absence of 
such a policymaking role the opposition parties may have little 
incentive to support minority government. Conversely, the SNP’s 
experience may have convinced both major parties that they do not 
need to form a coalition government to satisfy their policy objectives.  
